Lord Methuen and the British Army by Stephen M. Miller

Author:Stephen M. Miller [Miller, Stephen M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, General, Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781136322839
Google: Wtr3oEFRIbEC
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2012-11-12T01:16:59+00:00

THE LESSONS OF MAGERSFONTEIN

In the search for reasons as to why Methuen's attack at Magersfontein failed, it is necessary to analyse several factors of the battle plan and its enactment. We have already seen that Methuen's decision to delay the advance to Kimberley by one week after the Battle of Modder River, as well as his decision to choose the ground in front of Magersfontein Hill as the site for his next encounter, were the correct decisions given the circumstances and limited military information. However, these two decisions did not make the British defeat at Magersfontein inevitable, and in the rest of this chapter I will address the issues which directly concern the events of 10–12 December.

The first issue is that of reconnaissance, and its failure before the Battle of Magersfontein. In general, British reconnaissance, as discussed in the previous chapter, failed throughout South Africa in the early stages of the war because the British had not been properly trained to conduct reconnaissance against a foe armed with modern weapons. Reconnaissance had already failed Methuen at Belmont and at the Modder River. At Magersfontein he had very little information available. He was not aware of the location of his enemy's flanks, he did not know their numbers, nor their exact whereabouts, and he knew little about the ground. All this explains Wauchope's decision to push further ahead towards Magersfontein until his troops, unbeknown to him, had come within 400 yards of the Boer trenches.

The failure of reconnaissance was due to two factors. First, Methuen had few mounted troops, and even fewer mounted troops who were trained scouts. (The cavalry regiments were not trained as professional scouts.) Methuen's only reliable scouts were Rimington's Guides, and there were too few of them to do all that was required. Second, the improved rifle placed in the skilful hands of the mobile Boer made even long-range reconnaissance dangerous. This danger was further aggravated in the area around Magersfontein where there was little cover and several barbed wire obstacles. Indeed, the British were not trained properly to reconnoitre under these conditions, and, if blame must be assigned, it should not to be placed on Methuen or any of his men but on the War Office, which failed to supply and train the necessary troops and provide accurate maps. Caught as he was between the necessity of relieving Kimberley on a timetable caused by political demand from home as well as the real demand of Kimberley's provisions growing sparse, and the inability to gather adequate information about the enemy, Methuen felt that he could not wait. In all likelihood, a further delay would not have brought more information but would simply have given the Boers more time to fortify their left flank and receive reinforcements. Thus he chose correctly to strike when he did.

The second issue which played a role in the failure of the British attack at Magersfontein was Methuen's decision to bombard the Boer position the night before the assault. This issue has been discussed above in detail.

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